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Modigliani-Miller Theorem on the irrelevance of corporate
T hecapital
structure is perhaps the best-known result in modern
finance. Simply put, the theorem states that, under certain
assumptions, the market value of a firm is independent of its capital
structure. Substituting equity for debt or, as occurred during much of
the 1980s, adding layers of debt to the capital structure of a firm,
would, under the stylized assumptions of the theorem, have no
effect on its value.I The theorem applies to the mix of debt and
equity and more generally to the mix of debt-as between secured
and unsecured or senior and subordinated-as well.2 Understanding
existing patterns of debt and equity begins therefore with the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem. One must identify which of its
assumptions do not hold and explain why relaxing them leads to the
patterns of debt and equity that currently exist. Much scholarship
has focused on the assumption that changes in capital structure do
not affect how a firm’s assets are used. There is little reason to think
that this assumption is true. As is now well-understood, equityt Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I thank Barry
Adler, Ian Ayres, Doug Baird, Lucian Bebchuk, Walter Blum, James Bowers,
Charles Calomiris, Richard Epstein, Frank Easterbrook, Rob Gertner, Hideki
Kanda, Bob Rasmussen, Steve Shave11 and the participants in the Work-inProgress workshop at the University of Chicago and the Law and Economics
Workshop at Harvard Law School for their comments; Jeff Brown for research
assistance; and the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation and the Sarah Scaife
Foundation for research support.
1 Franc0 Modig liani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 Amer. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958);
Franc0 Modigliani &. Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the
Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 Amer. Econ. Rev. 433 (1963). For a standard
exposition, see Thomas E. Copeland &J. Fred Weston, Financial Theory and
Corporate Policy 439 (3d edition 1988).
2 See Alan Schwartz7 The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand.
L. Rev. 1051 (1984).

2

CHICAGO WORKING PAPER

IN

LAW & ECONOMICS

holders may choose different projects if debt is present from what
they would choose otherwise. Equityholders enjoy all of the benefits
of successful projects but share the losses from unsuccessful ventures
with creditors.
Over the last decade, a number of scholars have tried to extend
this analysis to the institution of secured credit. They have asked
whether the desirability of giving decisionmaking power to the equityholders and the resulting need of creditors to ensure that the equityholders do not abuse this power explains why some creditors take
security and others do not. These scholars have focused on the way
secured credit might enhance the ability of creditors to monitor
debtor misbehavior. The current posture of this literature offers only
some support for the view that secured credit matters for monitoring
debtor misbehavior.3
In addressing only debtor misbehavior, the focus of this scholarship has been too narrow. Just as the debtor is capable of misbehaving, so too are the creditors. A creditor may seize assets and sell them
piecemeal even if a sole owner would keep the assets together. If no
creditor enjoyed priority over another, each creditor might have an
incentive to spend resources monitoring both the debtor and other
creditors to ensure that it was not left unpaid if the debtor failed.
Whether secured credit may be a device that minimizes, or even
eliminates, creditor misbehavior is a question that has been completely neglected in the literature.
In this paper, I set forth a simple game-theoretic model to analyze these questions. The formal model exposes weaknesses in the
existing literature and suggests that it is unlikely that secured credit
responds to debtor misbehavior. More importantly, I suggest that secured credit is a sensible response to the problem of creditor misbehavior. As a corollary, I offer a new view of perhaps the central
premise of recent bankruptcy scholarship. The same scholars who
have not seen any link between secured credit and the problem of
3 Compare Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yde L. J. 1143 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale
L.J. 49 (1982) with Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1057-59. See also Douglas G.
Baird, Property Rights, Priority Rights, and Ostensible Ownership: The
Deep Structure of Article 9 in P. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts &J. McDonnell, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code (1988).
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creditor misbehavior have nevertheless advanced the notion that
bankruptcy law exists in the main to overcome the problems that
arise when too many creditors chase too few assets.4 By failing to see
that secured credit is itself a response to the problem of creditor
misbehavior, these scholars have misunderstood the institution of secured credit and, more importantly, they have structured their analysis of bankruptcy law upon an unsound premise.5
These scholars assume that creditors who face a troubled debtor
confront a common pool problem and they then assert that
bankruptcy law exists to overcome it, just as laws exist to overcome
common pool problems elsewhere. The common pool problem,
however, is typically the domain of property law. It arises among
strangers who have had no established relationship with each other
or any common third party. The setting is an English pasture in the
4 Thomas H Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and
the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857 (1982); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas
H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment-on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97 (1984); Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and
Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986) (hereinafter cited as “Logic,,). But compare
James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan: Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy
Law and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution (forthcoming,
Georgia Law Review) (noting possible relationship between secured transactions and bankruptcy theory).
5 This work also suffers from a more basic defect, as it begins the inquiry
in the wrong place. It starts with the notion that the underlying debt-collection rules are fixed and that bankruptcy law should be designed around them.
An issue for further research is whether first accepting state law baselines and
then asking how those baselines can best be respected in the context of a collective bankruptcy proceeding fundamentally misconceives the nature of the inquiry that should be made. We might be better served by focusing directly on
the form of a set of optimal insolvency rules. In particular, the current
bankruptcy law is now designed to solve the common pool problem, but that
problem arises only because levying on assets and establishing priority to those
assets are treated as one. If they were separated -if seizing assets left unchanged
the unsecured creditor’s right to only a pro rata share of the assets if the debtor
were insolvent at the time of seizure - t h e traditional common pool problems
would be minimized, if not completely eliminated. We need to weigh carefully
the advantages and disadvantages of linking seizure and priority, but, by looking only at bankruptcy law with debt-collection rules as a given, we have ignored these fundamental questions.
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fifteenth century$ a Texas oil field at the turn of the century,7 or a
fishery in Malaysia today. * The common pool problem itself arises
from an overlapping distribution of rights defined by equating acquisition or capture with an absolute priority in ownership. When
each person has the same right to graze, drill or fish and no one has
the right to exclude, the dominant strategy for each person is to
graze, drill or fish, without regard to the interest all have in assuring
that the resource is put to its best use.
Those who enjoy these rights to a common resource acquire
them independently. There are no prior dealings. By contrast, the
relationships among the debtor and its creditors are largely contractual. The parties themselves can structure their relationships with
each other to minimize the common pool problem. Firms commonly have both secured and unsecured creditors; still others grant
no secured debt but have senior and subordinated unsecured creditors. By the initial allocation of priority rights, many firms can avoid
the common pool problem altogether. Such a case would exist, for
example, if the parties could ensure that the firm would owe a single
secured creditor more than it would be worth anytime it failed.
There are substantial reasons to think that the debtor will seek
ways to minimize the resulting harms of the common pool. The
creditors can anticipate the common pool and its consequences.
They will therefore charge interest rates to cover the anticipated
losses from the common pool. Because the debtor bears these costs
directly, the debtor will internalize the cost of the common pool and
will therefore search for mechanisms to minimize this cost. Security
interests and other priority devices play this role.
To put the point in different terms, the common pool problem
is a multi-party version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.9 Actions that are
in the self-interest of the individual fisher, shepherd, oil driller or
6 See J A Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England 1450-1850
(MacMillan Press Ltd. 1977).
7 See Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to
the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 Amer. Econ.
Rev. 87 (1984).
* See E . N . Anderson > Jr ‘9 A Malaysian Tragedy of the Commons, in The
Qestion of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources
(Bonnie M. McCay and James M. Acheson, eds. 1987)
9 Jackson, Logic, supra note 4, at IO.
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prisoner run contrary to the interests of the group. If one’s focus is
too narrow, however, one may identify something as a Prisoner’s
Dilemma when it in fact is a small decisionmaking problem embedded in a much larger one, The self-interested acts of individuals,
which may appear harmful to the group when seen in the context of
the small problem, may in fact correspond to the interests of the
group when seen in the large problem.10 The legal literature does
reflect this insight in the particular case of repeated play of Prisoner’s
Dilemma games where it is well-known that socially efficient results
may be obtained even while allowing for independent decisionmaking. 11 The broader range of ways in which embedding can occur has
yet to receive substantial attention. This paper examines a particular
version of an embedded game, while leaving to another day a more
general discussion of embedded games and legal rules.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section I sets out a brief
road map to the worlds of secured and prioritized credit. Security
interests and priority serve many purposes; my story is about situations in which the value of the assets in a firm depends on how
control over them is exercised and as such occupies a well-defined
spot on the map. Section II explores the extent to which problems
of misbehavior can be addressed through contract and argues that
more powerful devices are required to control misbehavior. For
debtor misbehavior, monitoring often will be required; for creditor
misbehavior, devices to stop monitoring will be needed. In each case,
lo A similar point is made in George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational
Choice in Comparative Politics, 7 (1990).
I1 See, e.g., Alan Sykes, Optimal Threat Strategies in International
Commercial Relations: A Strategic Analysis of Section 301 (Unpublished
Manuscript); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
277, 341-43 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. L.J. 1495, 1542-44 (1990); John K.
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear
Deterrence and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 569 (1989); Henry N. Butler
8c Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677, 692 (1988); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and
Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 928 (1984). This literature draws
upon the experimental work in Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation
(1984) and the theoretical work in Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk
Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54 Econometrica 532 (1986).
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the important consequences of monitoring externalities must be
addressed. Section III considers three formal models of these situations: a debtor-misbehavior model; a common pool (or creditor misbehavior) model; and a combined debtor and creditor misbehavior
model. In each of the three cases, I set out a simple two-person
model and apply a standard game-theoretic solution concept to suggest how individual decisionmaking can be coordinated without
writing full-blown contracts among the various parties. Section IV
concludes the paper.
I. T HE W ORLD OF S ECURED AND P RIORITIZED C REDIT
Security interests arise for a variety of different reasons. Before I
focus on security interests in personal property of the limited-liability
firm, I briefly examine the role that security interests play in the
economy generally. Secured transactions range from a $10 loan at
the local pawnshop secured by a pledge of a ring, to the mortgage on
my house, to multibillion dollar loans secured by all of a company’s
assets. In the United States, the largest part of the secured transaction market is real property lending. At the end of 1990, there were
_approximately $8.5 trillion outstanding in nongovernmental debt?
Of that, $3.86 trillion, or more than 45% of the total, consisted of
real property mortgage debt. No other single category of debt looms
so large in the private economy.13
Secured lending on real estate dwarfs other secured or prioritized
lending, but the balance is far from insubstantial. Another $285 billion in debt is represented by automobile financing, most of which is
secured. 14 Another $96 billion is lent by the asset-based finance
industry. I5 This category covers loans to businesses by banks, financing companies and others for which the primary collateral is
the personal property assets of the business. This debt is privately
held. Corporate bonds and notes, in contrast, are often publicly held.
l2 See table I 59 Summary of Credit Market Debt Outstanding in 77
Federal Reserve Billekn, No. IO (October, 1991).
l3 Id
l4 Sic table I 55 Consumer Installment Credit in 77 Federal Reserve
Bulletin, No. IO (dct;ber, 1991).
l5 See Frank J Donahue Getting back to basics, 48 The Secured Lender
36,39 (Januv/FebAary, 1992j.

S ECURITY I NTERESTS , M ISBEHAVIOR ,

AND

C OMMON P OOLS

7

As a general matter, these instruments are unsecured, though some
categories, such as utility bonds and equipment trust certificates,
routinely involve security. These issues are sufficiently common that
secured credit was used in approximately 18% of the new corporate
issues over the three-year period 1988-1990.16 During that same
period, another 15% of the new corporate issues created prioritized
credit. Senior debentures and senior notes-even senior subordinated notes-were commonly issued.
Given this factual pattern, it would be surprising if secured credit
played the same role in all transactions. It almost surely does not.
There are at least five different roles security interests can play. First,
they minimize the costs of making and collecting loans. Second,
they reduce the need to monitor in situations where the property’s
value is largely independent of how it is managed. Third, they make
assets available to creditors on default that would otherwise be
shielded from them. Fourth, through a security interest, a debtor can
commit to a creditor that the debtor will not after-the-fact create
debt-consensually or nonconsensually-that is superior to or on par
with preexisting debt. Fifth and finally, security interests-and priority devices more broadly- c o n t r o l monitoring of assets in situations in which the way control over them is exercised matters. This
fifth role needs to be fleshed-out, but before doing so in detail, consider the first four roles one by one.
Pawnbroking is among the most common of secured transactions. More than 35 million such loans are made each year.17 The
amount lent is usually less than $100, often substantially less. Security interests help minimize transactions costs for these loans. Detailed investigations into the borrower’s net worth would cost more
than the amount borrowed. The best evidence I can give of my
ability to pay is to deliver to the pawnbroker an asset with a value
that exceeds the size of the loan. Even that is not foolproof, as there
could be a thief in my chain of title, but for most personal property,
possession is still the best evidence of ownership. The pledge in
pawnbroking also minimizes collection costs. The pawnbroker need
not chase down the defaulting borrower, but instead can pay off the
loan by selling the asset. Again, without security, collection costs
l6 Compiled from issues of Corporate Financing Week.
l7 American Banker, November 15,1991, p.1.
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would loom large relative to the amount lent. The security interest
minimizes the costs of making and collecting these small loans.
A different story must be told for real estate mortgages. Detailed
investigations of financial responsibility are standard. The costs of
drafting and recording a mortgage increase rather than decrease the
costs of making the loan. They may decrease the costs of collecting
in the event of a default, but these costs are small relative to the size
of the loan itself. Given the increased expense in creating real estate
mortgages and the relatively modest reductions in collecting them,
real estate mortgages cannot readily be understood as devices for
minimizing direct transaction costs. Instead, security interests in real
estate reduce needless monitoring of the debtor’s behavior. My
mortgage lender has yet to appear at my house to see if I have fixed
the leaky faucet in the kitchen. Indeed, if all goes well, my lender
does little more than collect checks and remind me occasionally of
my duty to keep my house insured. While there is little doubt that
real estate values change dramatically over time-this fact has driven
the recent surge in “Chapter 20” bankruptcies-almost all of the
variation affects the market as a whole and little of it is idiosyncratic.
Homeowners could reduce value by destroying their homes, but almost surely will not do so, and they lack any good means of risking
the value of the house in. exchange for some large potential upside.
Consequently, my mortgage lender need only worry that I will
try to make off with the value of the house by selling it, pocketing
the cash and disappearing. A security interest on the house effectively prevents this. The security interest follows the house into the
new owner’s hands. Note well the difference in the positions of the
unsecured creditor and the secured creditor. If I sell the house for its
market value, the unsecured creditor has no right to go against the
house in the new owner’s hands. 18 The secured creditor’s rights
continue in full as if I still owned the house.
Another factor at work relates to state and federal exemption
laws for the assets of individuals. It is a commonplace that security
interests affect the relative rights of the creditors; it is easy to overl8 Under the uniform fraudulent conveyance laws, payment of fair consideration is an absolute defense, so long as the purchaser is without knowledge
of the fraud. See Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 5 9; Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 9 8.
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look that security interests also directly affect the rights between the
debtor and the creditor. Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code sets
forth a set of federal exemptions. A state can supplement this
scheme if it so chooses or displace it entirely (and many states have
chosen the latter), but most states have their own exemptions and
some are extremely favorable to debtors. (Florida and Texas are wellknown in this regard.) The rather mysterious line drawn is that
while the debtor cannot simply waive these exemptions as against
unsecured creditors, I9 the debtor can grant an enforceable security
interest in many of the otherwise exempt assets. Security interests
make property available to creditors on default that would otherwise
be denied to them.20
The role played by a mechanism is in part determined by what
role the legal rules assign to it. For example, the security interest is
how the legal regime allows a debtor to commit to a creditor that it
will not after-the-fact create debt that is superior to or on par with
preexisting debt. To put the point differently, the legal system currently will not generally enforce simple negative pledge clauses or
promises of priority and therefore, without more, an unsecured
creditor would suffer the risk that later-appearing debt would dilute
the value of earlier debt. In the absence of such a commitment, unsecured creditors would have to forecast the extent of later debt and
charge interest based on that forecast. Prior unsecured lenders would
also be at risk of dilution through later-appearing nonconsensual
debt. Like limited liability, security interests play an important role in
limiting the extent to which later nonconsensual creditors can share
in assets intended to be set aside for particular creditors.
The answer to the question ‘Why secured credit here?” thus is at
least in part answered by the role assigned to secured credit under
current law. The attributes attached to the security interest by the
legal regime-its special status as against third-party purchasers, or as
. $ 522(e) and FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R.
l9 See II U. S. C
44442)

l

2o There are limits on the extent to which this can occur. Section 522(f)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to avoid a broad category of
nonpossessory, nonpurchase money liens. Also, the taking of such a lien
constitutes an unfair practice under 16 C.F.R. 444.2. See, e.g. Robert Scott,
Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
73% 747 (1989).

IO

C HICAGO W ORKING P APER

IN

L AW & E CONOMICS

a means of receiving rights against otherwise exempt assets, or as a
commitment device-explain its uses. But there are other situations
in which creating prioritized credit may be useful and secured credit
is a sufficient way to do that. In the balance of the paper, I consider
situations in which the value of the assets in a firm depends on how
control over them is exercised.
II. MONITORING AND CONTRACTS
How the assets are managed and their resulting value will reflect
the returns that accrue to the group exercising control over the assets. This is seen most often in firms that have both debt and equity.
The interests of shareholders, as a group, and those of creditors, as a
group, diverge. Shareholders embrace investment policies when they
have creditors that they would reject if they did not. Four types of
possible misbehavior are commonly identified? (i) flat-out withdrawals of assets by shareholders; (ii) increased risk with internal
funds (or asset substitutions) 2~) (iii) increased risk through new
funds and new projects23; and (iv) forgoing valuable investment
opportunities.24
A. Monitoring, Solvency and the Limits of Contracts

Creditors can reduce the risk of misbehavior either by monitoring or by acquiring certain rights at the outset. These are distinct
approaches. Indeed, given sufficient rights in the debt contract, the
amount of costly monitoring that takes place may go down. “Mefirst” covenants,25 the related automatic first priority position26 and
z1 George G. Triantis, Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect
Information (forthcoming, J. Legal Stud.) (1992).
22 See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy,
Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J. Fin. 247, 250
(1979); Jackson &. konman, supra note 3, at 1149-50; Levmore, supra note 3, at
p-52.
23 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama &. Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance, 150-52 (1972); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. Legal
Stud. 209 (1989).
24 See Triantis, supra note 21.
25 See Fama &. Miller, supra note 23, at 151-52; James S. Ang 8c Jess H.
Chua, Coalitions, the me-first rule, and the liquidation decision, II Bell J.
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secured credit itself can be understood as attempts at reducing
misbehavior through contracts alone. These clearly work best when
the debtor has to go outside the firm to raise new funds for a risky
and undesirable project. If the first lender takes a security interest in
all of the assets of the debtor, the debtor is simply legally barred from
granting a superior or equal interest in existing assets to a second
lender.
Contracts alone will prove inadequate, however, given all the
means by which shareholders can transfer wealth. Monitoring may
be necessary to prevent asset substitutions, shareholder theft or diversion of profitable opportunities. Even though the contract between the debtor and the lender may bar asset substitution and even
though the applicable legal regime surely bars shareholder theft, the
contract and the laws are not self-enforcing. If the debtor can proceed unilaterally, the creditors will need to monitor the debtor in order to protect themselves from misbehavior after they have handed
over the money to the debtor.27
The difficult problem of getting the debtor to behave appropriately through contract terms alone without additional monitoring
can be made more concrete. Consider an example that will occupy
much of the paper. A debtor has a choice between two investment
projects. Each project requires the debtor to borrow SIOO.~* Project I
is certain to yield SII~. Project 2 is a high-risk project: 90% of the
time it yields $40, and the remaining IO% of the time it yields $635.
Note that the expected payoff for Project 2 is $99.50 and is therefore
Econ. 355 (1980); Michelle J. White, Public policy toward bankruptcy: me-first
and other priority rules, II Bell J. Econ. 550 (1980).
26 Schwartz, supra note 23.
27 Note that I focus on monitoring after the debtor receives the money.
Monitoring, or screening, surely takes place before money is lent, see, e.g.,
Barry E. Adler, A New Perspective on the Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle
(forthcoming, Journal of Legal Studies), but that screening does not prevent
misbehavior after-the-fact.
28 Fiing the level of outside investment required puts to one side interactive effects between contract design and investment seen in, for example,
Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The
One-Period Problem, 52 Rev. Econ. Stud. 647 (1985).

I2

C HICAGO W ORKING P APER

IN

L AW & E CONOMICS

less than the $100 (in expected value) the debtor would have to pay
risk-neutral creditors to finance the project.z9
In a world of full information and complete enforcement of
contracts, the problem of misbehavior is readily solvable through
contracts. If the creditors thought that the debtor would undertake
Project I, financing would be readily forthcoming, because the sure
return of SII5 more than covers the required debt payments of $100.
In contrast, Project 2 would not be financed. Its expected payout is
not enough to repay the $100 loan. Problems arise, however, if the
creditors cannot control which project the debtor undertakes. As
long as the debtor cannot credibly commit to undertaking Project I,
it will be tempted to undertake Project 2, regardless of what it tells
the creditors at the time of the loan. If the debtor chooses Project 2,
90% of the time, the firm fails and the debtor gets nothing, but IO%
of the time, the debtor nets $535. Adopting Project 2 therefore yields
the debtor, on average, $53.50. Project 2 is therefore attractive to the
debtor because the debtor nets only $15 from Project I. The creditors,
by contrast, enjoy none of the gain if Project 2 succeeds and suffer
the costs if it fails, as it likely will. If the debtor invests in Project 2,
the creditors recover, on average, only $46 of the $100 they are owed,
while they are sure to be paid in full if the debtor chooses Project I.
Given the debtor’s incentives, the creditors will not lend to the
debtor if they cannot ensure that it will invest in Project I rather
than Project 2.
The debtor and the creditors therefore will want to alter the
debtor’s incentives in choosing between the two projects. The
debtor may make the following promise: “If Project 2 is chosen, I
promise to give you all of the revenues; otherwise, I will pay you
$100." Given the assumption of full information-meaning here
that the information is both immediately known to both parties30
and is immediately communicable to any third part$l---the creditors
would know immediately if the debtor chose Project 2. Given the
29
AA For simplicity 9 I assume throughout a risk-free rate of interest of 0%.
j” That is in the standard language of the theory of contracts, that the
information is bbservable. See Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory
of Contracts, 134 in Advances in Economic The&y-Fifth World Congress
(Truman F. Bewley ed. 1987).
31 That is 9 that the information is verifiable. See id.
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assumption of complete enforcement of contracts, the creditors
could then enforce the debtor’s promise to turn over all of the revenues from the project given its selection. As a result, the debtor
would never select Project 2 and would instead select Project I. If
the debtor makes this commitment, debt financing for Project I will
be readily forthcoming. Note, of course, that many other contracts
bring about the same result in a world of full information and complete enforcement. Any promise that had the effect of making the
debtor’s overall wealth lower when Project 2 was selected over Project I would have the same effect.
But information is never perfect and courts limit the range of
contracts that they will enforce. The self-enforcing commitment
that is almost tautologically available with full information and
complete enforcement is therefore lost in a more realistic setting.
Enforcement of the forcing contract requires that the creditors
know which project was chosen. Without more, they typically will
not know. Everything depends on taking from the debtor any incentive to choose Project 2, but the debtor will have this incentive as
long as the creditors cannot monitor what the debtor is doing and
monitoring is costly.
Consider again the forcing contract. The debtor promises to pay
over all of Project 2's revenues if Project 2 is chosen, but only $100 if
Project I is chosen. If the creditors spent nothing on verifying project choice, the debtor would lose its incentive to choose Project I.
The debtor could choose Project 2. If the project failed, the debtor
might turn over the $40 as per the contract, but if the project succeeded, it would turn over only $100. That would violate the contract, but without additional investigation, the creditors will not
know whether the debtor in fact chose Project 2. Two different
events-choice of Project I or choice of Project 2 and success-are
consistent with the payment of the $100, even though only the
former complies with the contract. To distinguish these two situations the creditors would have to make costly after-the-fact inquiries. Part of what may separate creditors from debtors is precisely
the expertise that is required to know which project should be chosen or even what project has been chosen.
One might address this problem by expanding the scope of the
contract. Contracts could depend on the debtor’s choice of project,
the realized state of the world, the payments actually made by the
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debtor, and the information investment (or monitoring) decisions
made by the creditors, but ultimately the creditors must confront the
difficulty of drafting a contract sophisticated enough to give the
debtor the right incentives and simple enough to allow them to
monitor its performance cheaply. Even if the creditors are able to
surmount these barriers, they still face the burden of persuading a
third party that the debtor has in fact broken its promises. Even if
the gap between creditor and debtor information regarding project
choice can be lowered at will (though at a cost), there is no assurance that this information can be communicated effectively to a
judge or jury.
B. Externalities in Monitoring and the Optimal Level of Monitoring

Given the inability of contractual terms alone, to ensure appropriate behavior by the debtor, creditors commonly monitor their
debtors. As already noted, creditors fear that their debtors will take
inappropriate risks, or simply steal, and will thereby dissipate the assets otherwise available to satisfy their claims. When there are many
creditors, we face the additional problem of ensuring that creditors
do not duplicate the efforts of one another. Introducing more than
one creditor also creates monitoring problems as among the creditors. Creditors fear their fellow creditors. When the going gets
tough, the tough creditor gets going: aggressive creditors seek payment of their claims in full from the failing debtor with the hope of
avoiding the pro rata payment regime that would otherwise apply in
bankruptcy. Given that seizure of property determines priority to
that property, each unsecured creditor needs to worry that other
creditors will exercise their right to withdraw assets from the debtor
in the wake of a default. Creditors will monitor their debtor both to
decide when to withdraw assets and to prevent asset withdrawals by
their fellow creditors.
In these situations, it is possible to identify an optimal level of
monitoring. Whether that level of monitoring will result without
any effort to induce that outcome depends critically on the extent to
which monitoring externalities exist. If monitoring is a private
good-if monitoring by one creditor has no effect on a second
creditor-the right level of monitoring may occur without the need
for any effort to induce that outcome. Although some forms of
monitoring may follow that pattern, more often than not monitor-
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ing involves externalities. These may be positive, as they are when
my monitoring of the debtor means the debtor remains solvent,
conferring benefits on my fellow creditors. Or they may be negative,
as when my monitoring of the debtor allows me to detect failure
more quickly and thereby grab the available assets first. In these situations, it will take some work to get the right level of monitoring.
The way in which these externalities work themselves out is
complex. For example, that monitoring confers benefits on the
other creditors does not alone lead to less than optimal monitoring.
If monitoring conferred special benefits to the monitor that were
not available to the rest of the group, for example, monitoring might
be set at the socially optimal amount notwithstanding the externality. Indeed, beating the pro rata rule might be the compensation required to induce an unsecured creditor to monitor the debtor.32 This
possibility is of course undercut today by the right of the trustee to
recover eve-of-bankruptcy transfers. 33 Identifying this benefit to the
monitoring creditor, however, does not tell us how coordination is
to be achieved among the potential monitors. An equilibrium would
seem to require that each creditor have fairly detailed knowledge of
the benefits and costs of monitoring to the other creditors.
Again, the full extent of the externalities depends critically on assumptions made about monitoring. In fact, one rough way of organizing much of the preexisting literature on the problem of the misbehaving debtor and secured credit is keyed to the monitoring assumptions. The critical point is the extent to which the secured
creditor can tailor its monitoring to the particular situation. On one
view, the secured lender specializes and takes a security interest only
on a well-defined category of assets, such as equipment, inventory or
receivables. The secured creditor’s monitoring of how the debtor
treats its equipment does not spill over to monitoring the debtor’s
other assets. The only comfort that the unsecured creditors can take
from the secured creditor’s monitoring is that it reduces the chance
that the secured creditor will later seek to share in the assets not
32 This is precisely the explanation given for allowing bank depositors to
withdraw on demand in Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The
Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81
Amer. Econ. Rev. 497 (1991).
33 II U.S.C. 5 547.
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subject to the security interest. It gives them no comfort that the
debtor is not misbehaving with the unliened assets. This vision of
monitoring is seen in work by Jackson and KronmaG4 and by
Baird.35
The second view of monitoring assumes that spillovers are inevitable. For example, the debtor loses absolute discretion over inventory when a secured creditor monitors receivables. Other creditors
anticipate the spillover and adjust their monitoring accordingly. In
the extreme, monitoring by one creditor prevents all misbehavior,
and the only issue is allocating the burden of monitoring. This view
captures the essence of the public-good aspect present in the enforcement of group rights. It also reflects the idea that tailoring is
costly and we often live in a one-size-fits-all world. Many lenders
have a standard drill for their auditors to follow. for each kind of
debtor. It is a means of economizing on their internal decisionmaking and controlling their internal principal-agent problems. Tailoring may be irrelevant also, if the paradigm secured transaction is the
all-assets lender taking a security interest in all that Article 9, applicable real estate law and the remaining common law that fills the
gaps between the two allows. This vision of monitoring is seen in
the work of Levmore36 and SchwartG7
My analysis builds on this second view of monitoring. To highlight the problem of coordinating the actions of creditors, I make
several simplifying assumptions. I take the cost of monitoring
needed to curb misbehavior as a given, fixed cost. Moreover, if any
creditor monitors the debtor, all debtor misbehavior is prevented.
Monitoring by additional creditors adds nothing. A similar assumption will be made for creditor withdrawals. If one (and only one)
creditor monitors, that creditor will be able to withdraw assets successfully in the event of a pending debtor failure, and that creditor
will thereby avoid the pro rata payment regime. If more than one
creditor monitors, all withdrawals are prevented, and if the debtor
fails, pro rata payments are made. Note that under these assumptions
monitoring is a public good. Monitoring by one creditor prevents all
34
35
36
37

See Jackson & Kronman,supra note 3,at 1154 n.4.
See Baird, supra note 3.
See Levmore, supra note 3.
See Schwartz, supra
note
at2, 1056-57.
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misbehavior, and each creditor benefits when misbehavior is prevented. Note, though, as already suggested, the assumption that
monitoring costs are a given, fixed cost prevents the monitor from
individuating its monitoring decisions. The model therefore does
not account for the possibility that the amount of monitoring a
creditor chooses to do might be optimal for that creditor but suboptimal for the creditors as a whole.
As noted, the assumption that monitoring by one creditor is
sufficient to prevent all debtor misbehavior captures the public-good
problem in monitoring. Public goods and free riding go hand-inhand. As a group, the creditors face the question of how to coordinate their individual decisionmaking so as to reach the outcome that
is best for the group as a whole. The creditors could coordinate
through direct contracts among themselves to allocate monitoring
responsibility and cost-sharing. This would require a complex web of
contracts among the creditors and would almost surely be costly to
implement. Although we do see bilateral contracts among some
creditors-subordination agreements being the prime example-we
rarely see fully specified contracts among all the creditors.
Alternatively, following the public goods literature,38 some sort
of intermediate device could be interposed between the debtor and
the creditors. Indeed, banks and other financial intermediaries play
such a role in aggregating the otherwise separate actions and information of their depositors. 39 For the purposes of this paper, I ignore
the possibility of interposing an aggregation mechanism between
the creditors and the debtor, or equivalently, of allowing the
creditors to enter into contracts among themselves regarding monitoring. Although some creditors can coordinate their actions, situations arise in which they cannot. These give rise to the public good
problem in monitoring and are the situations on which I want to
focus.
38 See, e.g., Christopher Bliss & Barry Nalebuff, Dragon-Slaying and
Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good, 25 J. Pub. Econ. I
(1984); Glenn W. Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, An Experimental Evaluation
of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods, 97 J. Polit. Econ. 201
(1989).
39 See Douglas W Diamond Financial Intermediation and Delegated
Monitoring, 51 Rev. Ecoh. Stud. 39; (1984).
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In this section, I examine the relationship between monitoring
efficiency and the debtor’s capital structure. A common setting involving an entrepreneur with an investment project and two creditors is set out. Three cases are considered: a simple debtor-misbehavior model, a simple common pool model and a combined debtor
misbehavior/common pool model. Before looking at the cases, let
me sketch the current state of the literature and how my results
compare.
In their early work, Jackson and Kronman focused on the need
to monitor possible debtor misbehavior, and argued that security interests should be granted to high-cost monitors to reduce the
amount of monitoring they needed to do. Levmore40 criticized this
work, because it rested on the unlikely premise that secured creditors
would have higher costs of monitoring than unsecured creditors.
Levmore instead pursued the debtor-misbehavior model and argued
that secured credit responded to problems of freeriding on
monitoring and duplication in monitoring among unsecured
creditors. Schwartz, in turn, criticized Levmore’s description of the
debtor-misbehavior model, arguing that an equilibrium in which
only one creditor monitors will be reached without any capital
structure design. 41 Schwartz notes that in a multiple creditor model,
having one unsecured creditor monitor and no other unsecured
creditor monitor forms an equilibrium, given the assumptions about
monitoring. Duplicate monitoring or no monitoring at all are then
disequilibrium phenomena, and from this Schwartz concludes that
“the stable, pervasive existence of personal property security is quite
unlikely to be a response to the disequilibrium phenomenon of
duplicate monitoring.“42
My analysis revisits this analysis for the question of debtor misbehavior and, I believe, breaks new ground by confronting the creditor
misbehavior problems of the common pool. As to the simple debtormisbehavior model, Schwartz’s conclusion regarding the absence of
4o See Levmore, supra note 3.
41 See Schwartz, supra note 2.
42 Id. at 1057.
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a need for secured credit seems right, but his analysis seems incomplete. The monitoring game played among the creditors is characterized by multiple equilibria. Schwartz clearly understood that multiple equilibria would exist, but didn’t view that as problematic. Multiple equilibria, though, usually pose thorny coordination problems.
Indeed, the debtor monitoring game played by the creditors is similar to the well-known Battle of the Sexes game, except that the
creditors seek to coordinate on playing different strategies rather
than the same strategies as they usually do. Because of the multiplicity of equilibria, there can be no assurance that the creditors will appropriately coordinate their decisions. I suggest that eliminating
multiple equilibria is a critical component of capital structure design.
Notwithstanding that, security interests are unnecessary to create a
monitoring game with a single solution.43
More importantly, I argue that responding to the problem of
creditor misbehavior is of substantial importance in the design of
capital structures. Creditor misbehavior can have the form of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unlike the Battle of the Sexes and its multiple
equilibria, here a unique solution exists, but it’s a poor solution. Capital structure design is needed to get to a different solution and security interests can serve as the mechanism for reaching that superior
solution.
I.

General Statement of the Model

As the analysis in Section II should suggest, a full-blown model
of contracting in multiple creditor contexts would be dauntingly
complex. The model of this paper sidesteps this problem by focusing
on particular, well-known contractual forms for debt. The model
proceeds in four stages. In the first stage, the debtor enters the
lending market and signs two contracts providing total financing of
D, assumed here to be $100. I assume that the firm will have two
creditors, because secured and unsecured creditors are indistinguishable if the debtor has only a single creditor. Label the lending creditors C, and C,. At stage I, C, lends an amount d, at a fee schedule fI
and C, does the same for d, at schedule f2. A fee schedule may just
be an interest rate, but it may also include contingent charges, such
as reimbursement for legal fees, monitoring costs or the like. The as43 Though there are caveats. See infra at n. 49.
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sumption
of two creditors could be justified in a more general set.
ting 44 but operationally the firm will be required to choose dip the
face amount of the debt owed to creditor i, from the range o < di <
D for all i, d, + d, = D. I assume that the lending market is competitive and has a risk-free rate of return set at 0%.
The central question explored here is whether security interests
have any role to play in theApresence of other standard terms. Contracts are assumed to be standard debt contracts, meaning a fixed
amount is to be repaid, subject to solvency constraints. Three choices
are allowed. First, debt may be secured or unsecured, but, of course,
in the two-creditor model, only one creditor can be secured. Second,
the contract may (or may not) specify partial or full reimbursement
of creditor monitoring costs. Third, the debtor can distribute the
debt D between C, and C, arbitrarily, subject to the debt floor required to ensure a model with two creditors in equilibrium.
In stage two, after lending, the creditors simultaneously make
their individual monitoring decisions. That is, each creditor chooses
whether to monitor the debtor. This monitoring is assumed to convey information covering possible debtor misbehavior and possible
creditor misbehavior in the models where both are possible. This
assumes economies of scope in monitoring. Monitoring is costly,
and it will be assumed that there is a fixed cost of monitoring at
stage two, call it k1 for creditor C, and kz for creditor C,. Assume
that k, is $5 and b is $8. In stage three, in light of the monitoring
decisions, the debtor chooses between Projects I and 2. Project 2 will
be implemented if neither creditor monitors and if Project 2 is preferred by the debtor to Project I. Project I is carried out if either
creditor monitors the debtor. In stage 4, nature moves and determines the project’s outcome.
I ignore the possibility of direct contracts between the creditors
or between the creditors and an intermediary that in turn deals with
44 The assumption that debtor borrows from more than one creditor is
common, see, e.g.,fackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at I$?-60, but it would
be better to have that result appear endogenously in a more general model. The
result itself might be justified on the risks of instability associated with having
a single supplier of any good. It is surely common wisdom that it is prudent
for a firm to have relationships with more than one vendor to prevent dislocations that might arise if the vendor failed or switched supply policies.
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the debtor. Allowing either of these would undercut the central assumption that the debtor has two creditors acting noncooperatively.
I also assume that the creditor monitoring decisions are fully revealed
after the fact, so that there are no strategic issues raised with regard
to reimbursing monitoring costs and the like.
2.

The Debtor-Misbehavior Model

The first model explores whether a security interest is required to
induce efficient monitoring. Return to the case in which the debtor
has two projects available tU0 it. Each project requires debt financing
totalling $100. Project I is certain to yield ~115. Project 2 is a highrisk project: 90% of the time it yields z&o, and the remaining IO% of
the time it yields $635. As noted, the expected payoff for Project 2 is
~99.50, which, of course, is less than the $100 (in expected value) the
debtor would have to pay risk-neutral creditors to finance the project. The debtor has an incentive to substitute Project 2 for Project I,
because it receives most of the benefits of the high-risk/high--gain
project and bears few of its costs. In contrast, creditors expect to lose
money if the debtor is left unchecked and pursues Project 2. Hence,
the creditors will not invest unless the debtor can be monitored. Recall that monitoring is assumed to be indivisible and that monitoring
by one creditor suffices to prevent misbehavior.
At the first stage, competition among potential lenders to the
firm naturally limits the fee schedules that can be charged to the
debtor. Therefore, at the time of making the loan, each creditor
should expect to earn just a competitive rate of return. The payoffs
occur only after the second-stage monitoring game is complete. For
this reason, the creditors and the debtor need to anticipate the
monitoring decisions that will be made in the monitoring subgame.
Creditors must expect to earn at least a competitive rate of return
given the monitoring costs they will face. If the two proposed fee
schedules in the first stage would lead either creditor to anticipate a
subcompetitive or supracompetitive rate of return because of the
monitoring decisions those fee schedules would generate, new fee
schedules are needed.
The lenders have two decisions to make. First, each lender has to
set a fee schedule for lending. Assume initially that the $100 riskfree debt is split evenly between C, and C,. Second, each lender
must decide whether to monitor the debtor. Suppose that both
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lenders make their first-stage decisions on the assumption that C,
will monitor and C, will not. Given the underlying monitoring
technology and the certainty of debtor misbehavior without monitoring, the only possible equilibrium has one (and only one) creditor
monitoring. 45 Now consider the fee schedules of the creditors. C,
will seek payment of the amount lent plus interest at the risk-free
rate, or $50. Suppose that C, simply builds the monitoring charge
into the interest rate and therefore seeks payment of $55.
This arrangement forms a Nash equilibrium. That is, neither
the debtor nor C, or C, can improve their positions by deviating
from their courses of action, given the actions of the others. C, will
plan not to monitor, given that C, will plan to do so, and given that
C, will plan to monitor, the debtor will not be able to misbehave,
therefore the loans will be paid in full, and thus C, must just offer
the competitive rate on its loan. For C,, given that C, will not plan
to monitor, C, will plan to monitor, therefore the debtor will not
misbehave; C, charges an interest rate set to just cover its $5 monitoring costs. Note that the debtor gains nothing by redistributing its
borrowing between the two creditors. Given the assumptions used
by the creditors in setting their lending fees, each charges just the
risk-free rate and C, builds the monitoring charge into the interest
rate.
The interest rate and monitoring decisions are made in sequence, however, and we need to take this feature into account.
When the second-stage monitoring decisions are made-that is,
when the monitoring subgame occurs-the creditors will face the
following payoff matrix:
45 As has been noted before. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1057.
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C2
Not Monitor
CI

Monitor

Not Monitor
Monitor
Figure I.i: Payoffs without Contingent Reimbursement

That is, if neither creditor monitors, the debtor misbehaves. The
alternative project succeeds IO% of the time and the creditors are
paid in full but 90% of the time the project fails, and $40 is available
to be divided pro rata on C,‘s claim of $55 and C2’s claim of $50.
Taken together, this results in an expected payoff of $24 to C, and of
$22 to C,. If C, monitors and C, does not, the debtor will not misbehave; both creditors are paid in full and C, nets $50 ($55 - $5 monitoring cost). Note that both creditors earn the risk-free rate when
monitoring occurs as contemplated when the interest rates were set.
If C, monitors and C, does not, again the debtor behaves and both
creditors are paid in full, but C, earns a supracompetitive return. C,
set its interest rate to reflect the cost of monitoring, but did not do
so. C,‘s monitoring saved it from the costs of debtor’s misbehavior.
In contrast, C, earns less than the risk-free rate because it paid $50
but spent $8 in monitoring cost. C, bears the cost of monitoring
without charging for it. In the final cell, both creditors monitor, C,
earns a competitive rate and C, again loses out.
It is important to note that both of the cells in which one creditor monitors are Nash equilibria. If C, monitors, C, will not, and if
C, does not, C, will. Similarly, if& monitors, C, will not, and if C,
does not, C, will, notwithstanding that a different result was contemplated when the lending charges were set originally. The second
stage monitoring game exhibits two pure strategy Nash equilibria.
This game has the form of the well-known Battle of the Sexes
game, except that the players seek to play different strategies rather
than the same strategies. The multiple equilibria give rise to a coordination problem, and the Nash conception alone provides no way
to select among the various equilibria. To be sure, the parties anticipated one of these subgame results, but given the essential simultaneity of the monitoring decisions by each creditor, there is noth-
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ing that makes this outcome the obvious one. We would not think
the outcome obvious if we simply began with the monitoring subgame, and it is hard to see why one outcome becomes more likely
merely because we have embedded the monitoring subgame into the
larger fee-setting and monitoring game. Sometimes embedding may
help achieve a solution, 46 but this is not one of those times. The
creditors are not indifferent among the equilibria. Each would prefer
to freeride on the monitoring efforts of the other, and receive full
(or more than full) payment without incurring the monitoring
costs.
One should note that the outcome in which C, monitors and
C, does not should not be an equilibrium in the original game. The
interest rates were premised on C, monitoring and C, not monitoring. In this outcome, C, earns a supracompetitive return and C, a
subcompetitive one. Because the debtor ultimately bears the cost of
monitoring, it will seek an arrangement that has a unique equilibrium in the original game and all subgames. The debtor and its
creditors will try to create a payoff structure at the frost stage such
that there will be a single equilibrium at the second stage. To put
the point formally, the first-stage structure should be considered a
possible solution if (I) the resulting monitoring subgame is dominance solvable and (2) given the anticipated outcome in the subgame, the creditors just earn a competitive rate of return given the
design of the first-stage structure.
To put the point another way, the central problems for the
debtor and the creditors are assigning the role of monitor, ensuring
that the monitor actually does monitor, and creating a mechanism
that compensates (but does not overcompensate) the monitor for
this burden. The firm’s capital structure at the outset should be designed to eliminate the indeterminacy associated with multiple Nash
equilibria in the monitoring subgame. One way of doing this is to
ensure that the resulting monitoring subgame is dominance solvable.
Consider these ideas in the context of the simple misbehavior
model. Rather than having the monitoring costs covered through
the interest rate, the debtor should agree to pay a separate monitor46 See, e.g., Elon Kohlberg 8~. Jean-Francois Mertens, On the Strategic

Stability of Equilibria, 54 Econometrica 1003 (1986).
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ing charge to, say C,, if monitoring costs are incurred. That would
give the following payoff matrix in the monitoring subgame47:
P

L2

CI
.

Not Monitor

Monitor

Ahot Monitor

b3, 231

cm 421

Monitor

[so, PI

b, 421

Figure

1.2:

I

Payoffs with Contingent Reimbursement

The revised game has the same two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, but there is an important difference between this game and the
original subgame. For C,, monitoring weakly dominates not-monitoring. C, always nets $50 if it monitors but it may net only $23 if it
does not. That is, C, will never do worse by monitoring, and may do
better, and therefore C, should monitor. C, should recognize that
C, will in fact monitor and therefore decide not to monitor. In effect, we can remove the weakly-dominated strategies from consideration and instead focus on the new payoff matrix:
C2

\
CI

Monitor

ALot Monitor

Monitor

[so, PI

[so, 421

Figure 1.3: Payofs after Elimination of CI’s Weakly Dominated Strategy

Given this, C, will choose not to monitor.48
47 As before ? here and subsequently, payoffs in figures are the expected
payoffs calculated using the probability distributions given for a particular pro.

Ject

‘48 A general discussion of dominance solvability and elimination of
weakly-dominated strategies may be found in David M. Kreps, A Course in
Microeconomic Theory 417-21 (1990). There are, of course, criticisms that can
be leveled against this approach. In particular, Nozick and others have set forth
examples of games in which playing a dominant strategy leads to what might
be .considered unreasonable results. See Robert Nozick, Newcomb’s Problem
and Two Principles of Choice, reprinted in Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem (Richmond Campbell
and Lanning Sowden eds.). From that, they have argued that a different decisionmaking rule is needed, since the dominance rule does a poor job on fringe
cases. In this paper, however, I use the concept of dominance solvability in the
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This is a general result, so long as the monitoring creditor knows
that it will be paid in full if the debtor behaves. When the monitoring creditor is unsecured, however, it will be paid in full only if all
unsecured creditors (and any senior creditors) are paid in full as well.
Given the assumptions that neither player will be paid in full if the
debtor misbehaves and that the monitoring costs of C, are fully repaid, C, never does worse by monitoring and often does better. As
before, C, should monitor, and C, should not. Note that the creditors need to have very little specific information to reach these conclusions. Indeed, C, needs to know only that it will receive less than
full payment if the debtor misbehaves, and C, needs to know only
that fact and that C’s monitoring costs will be fully reimbursed.
The game with contingent payment of monitoring costs is dominance solvable, and this suggests that the indeterminacy of multiple
Nash equilibria in the monitoring subgame can be avoided through
the device of contingent full-payment of monitoring costs. It is
quite common for a loan contract to include provisions for reimbursement of the expenses involved in monitoring collateral, including expenses associated with using attorneys and the like.
What this means then is that we cannot justify security interests,
even after we have addressed the problem of multiple Nash equilibria . 49 Fortunately, debtor misbehavior is only half of the story; the
context of simple subgames that present none of the fringe cases. No one suggests that a richer decisionmaking rule that could replace the dominance rule
would lead to different results in those cases that we now consider readily
solved under the dominance rule. Indeed, we would probably consider the new
rule seriously flawed if it did. Other objections to the use of dominance arguments can be made. See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory 192-95 (1991).
49 A more complex story can be told and security interests may be useful
there. The examples in the text assume that monitoring the debtor results in
success. In reality, a project may fail even if the debtor is monitored. Project
success depends on more than just the debtor making the right decisions. Full
reimbursement of monitoring costs no longer suffices to make the monitoring
subgame dominance solvable, but it does if coupled with a security interest in
favor of the monitor. More precisely, contingent full-payment of monitoring
costs coupled with a security interest will result in a dominance solvable monitoring subgame if two conditions are satisfied: (I) if the debtor misbehaves,
there is a chance that the secured creditor will receive only partial payment; and
(2) if the debtor is monitored and behaves, the secured creditor is sure to be
paid in full, even if the other creditor is not.
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second half is creditor misbehavior, and it is the subject of the next
section.
3. Creditor Misbehavior

The possibility that a creditor will monitor its debtor’s solvency
follows directly from introducing even a single debt into an all-equity firm. Introducing more than one unsecured creditor creates a
richer set of monitoring possibilities and needs. These are the problems of the common pool. Coordination of decisionmaking in the
all-equity firm is very simple. Collective action by shareholders is the
norm. The shareholders as a group decide on the hiring and firing
of managers, investment strategies and indeed the firm’s continued
existence. Individual shareholders cannot unilaterally withdraw assets from the firm. They must act in concert with the others.
Debt changes decisionmaking about the firm’s assets. No longer
are decisions about the firm’s assets made only jointly. Certain entities-debtholders-are typically given the right to withdraw assets
from the firm without the consent of fellow creditors or of equityholders. For unsecured creditors, withdrawal of the assets also establishes priority to the assets. Each withdrawal harms creditors in as
many as three ways.
Both of these conditions may be plausible. Although for purposes of exposition I have modeled the debtor’s misbehavior as choosing a particular alternative investment project, in reality there is probably almost no-limit on the
extent to which a debtor can misbehave. For any particular secured obligation,
we can probably imagine misbehavior that would result in only partial payment
(or perhaps even no payment) being made to the secured creditor. The second
condition is also plausible, especially if we recognize that the division of the
debt among the creditors is not set exogenously but instead can be selected to
ensure that the second condition for dominance solvability is satisfied. Operationally, the amount of the debt owed to the secured creditor must be capped by
the bottom of the distribution of returns on the debtor’s project, and, in a
world of perfect information about that distribution, as assumed here, that can
be done easily. Secured lending is often done based on a percentage of asset
value, and coupling this with careful monitoring makes the second condition
plausible as well. This condition also matches the common wisdom that secured creditors usually are paid in full in bankruptcies.
Note, though, that all I have suggested is that full-cost reimbursement
with a security interest is sufficient for dominance solvability; other devices
such as more than full-cost reimbursement or rapid repayment of monitoring
costs might have the same effect.
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First, assets may be withdrawn from the firm and sold for too
little. This is the risk of inefficient sales. The holder of a $100 debt
removes the firm’s printing press and sells it for $100, notwithstanding that a more diligent seller would have received $150 for the press.
To be sure, the seller has to satisfy certain norms, typically procedural
and not substantive, 50 but it may do so without necessarily receiving
full price for the good sold. The withdrawing creditor bears none of
the loss in value from the inefficient sale, and therefore such sales
occur. Second, withdrawal of assets may break up efficient
combinations of assets. The printing press may be worth $100
standing alone, the dies for the press worth $25 standing alone, and
the press and the dies worth $150 if sold together. The creditor owed
$100 may withdraw the press alone and inflict a $25 loss on the remaining creditors. Again, the creditor bears none of the losses associated with the sale. Third, and finally, even if there are no asset
synergies and withdrawn assets are sold for full value, any withdrawal reduces the pool of assets otherwise available. Creditors will
monitor other creditors in an effort to police the pro rata distribution rules of bankruptcy. All of this follows from the three initial
premises of unilateral withdrawal rights, the link between withdrawal and priority, and an undifferentiated debt structure. In actuality, unilateral withdrawal rights are common and may even define
the debt contract. Although one can imagine debt without the right
to seize assets, such debt puts the creditor at the risk of a spiteful refusal to pay. Because these features seem so fixed, I consider only the
issues raised by creditor monitoring of withdrawals to prevent deviations from the pro rata distribution rules.
Consider the debtor again and its investment project. Assume
(for now) that the debtor cannot misbehave. What is new here is
the role of monitoring and its consequences. If one creditor monitors, and the other does not, the monitoring creditor will be able to
detect the failure and will withdraw assets from the debtor.
50 See e g the commercial reasonableness standard applicable to secured
sellers under ‘u:‘C.C. 5 9-504 and note the safe harbor of U.C.C. § g-507(2)
(“The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of
itself suffkient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.“)
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Through monitoring, the creditor will completely defeat the otherwise applicable pro rata distribution rule. Note that, for the creditors as a group, monitoring adds nothing. It simply redistributes
value among the creditors. In the prior misbehavior model, monitoring reallocated value between the debtor and the creditors as a group.
The debtor desired monitoring because only with monitoring could
it borrow at all. In the common pool, monitoring confers no benefit
on the debtor. Indeed, monitoring imposes a cost on the debtor, because the creditors will set their fee schedules to reflect the outcome
of the monitoring subgame.
Consider an example in which the probability of success for the
project is .8; assume that if Successful, the project results in total assets of $122.75, but if it fails, it is worth $84. (This gives the project an
expected value of a15 as before.) Assume that the creditors make
their first-stage fee schedule decisions on the assumption that neither player will monitor in the subgame, and consider the resulting
payoff matrix faced when the monitoring subgame is played:
C2
Not Monitor

CI

Monitor

Not Monitor
Monitor

Figure

2.1:

Payofs in Pure Common Pool Model= The Unsecured Case,
Low-Risk Debtor

.

This game is dominance solvable.51 C, will not monitor, regardless of what C, does, and C, will not monitor either. The costs
of monitoring exceed the benefits to be gained from avoiding the
pro rata rule, given the firm’s high probability of success.
Now suppose that the probability of success is only .5; the project
yields $146 if successful and $84 if it fails, giving again an expected
value of SIIS. Assume, as in the prior example, that the creditors
51 The best course of action for each player is independent of what the
other player does. When C, does not monitor, CI earns $50 instead of $47 if it
does not monitor; when C, monitors, CI earns $48 instead of $45 if it does not.
Similarly, when CI does not monitor, C, earns $50 instead of $48 if it does not
monitor; when CI does monitor, C, earns $48 instead of $47 by not monitoring. Both are better off not monitoring, regardless of what the other does.
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make their first-stage fee schedule decisions on the assumption that
neither player will monitor in the monitoring subgame, and consider the resulting payoff matrix in the subgame:
n
Monitor

Not Monitor
CI

Not Monitor
Monitor

Figure

2.2:

Payofls in Pure Common Pool Model= The Unsecured Case,
High-Risk Debtor, No Monitoring Expected

If the game played out as the creditors contemplated it would
when they set their fee schedules, each player would receive $50, the
appropriate competitive rate of return. But the game will not play
out that way. C, will monitor, regardless of what C, does, and C,
will therefore earn a subcompetitive rate of return. That means that
C, will reject the proposed fee-schedule pair, and a second set will
have to be considered. Assume instead, therefore, that the creditors
set their proposed fee schedules on the assumption that both players
will monitor in the monitoring subgame, which would give the
following payoff matrix:
C2

Not Monitor
CI

Monitor

Not Monitor
Monitor

Figure 2.3: Payofs in Pure Common Pool Modd- The Unsecured Case,
Hi&Risk Debtor, Monitoring Expected

This is once again dominance solvable: C, will monitor regardless of
what C, does, and the same is true for C,. Both creditors monitor
and earn competitive rates of return.
Under plausible circumstances, in a world of unsecured credit,
the problem of the common pool will result in the following monitoring pattern. Low-risk debtors will not be monitored at all-a nomonitoring equilibrium-because the cost of monitoring exceeds the
benefits gained from monitoring. (The benefits of monitoring are
either grabbing more than a pro rata share of the assets or ensuring

S ECURITY I NTERESTS , M ISBEHAVIOR ,

AND

C OMMON P OOLS

31

that one receives such a share.) High-risk debtors will be monitored
by both creditors-a dual monitoring equilibrium. That is, in a
world of unsecured credit, it will be a dominant strategy for each
creditor to monitor a high-risk debtor at stage 2.52 Each creditor will
therefore set first-period interest rates on the assumption that both
creditors will monitor the solvency of the high-risk firm. Because
monitoring is costly, interest rates will have to be higher to generate
competitive returns, and that will lower the value of equity. In this
model, monitoring creates no efficiencies and simply allocates value
between the creditors. In equilibrium, the creditors enjoy a
competitive rate of return and the debtor bears the cost of monitoring.
Introducing the possibility of secured credit changes the analysis.
Issuing secured credit to one of the creditors may eliminate the incentives for either creditor to monitor, and security will be socially
efficient if the cost of security is less than the total monitoring costs
of the two creditors. In the case of a low-risk debtor, neither creditor will monitor. In the absence of the risk of such inefficient monitoring, neither creditor will take security. One creditor, however,
will take security when the debtor is high-risk in order to ensure
that neither has the incentive to monitor the debtor’s insolvency. In
short, this model predicts a pattern of secured credit in which lowrisk firms do not use secured credit, while high-risk firms do. One
can illustrate this point formally by returning to the model and assuming that the debtor grants a security interest in all of the assets of
the firm to C,. The creditors face the following payoff matrix in the
monitoring subgame?
2 That is, having both creditors monitor will be the unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in the second stage monitoring game. The idea that
withdrawal is the dominant strategy if the bad state is known to have occurred
appears in the bank run literature. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Foundations of
Social Theory 215-218 (1990); and compare Andrew Postlewaite &Xavier Vives,
Bank Runs as Equilibrium Phenomenon, 95 J. Polit. Econ. 485 (1987).
53 The example sets the cost of issuing secured credit at $0, but this
simplification does not affect the results, because the cost of secured credit is
sunk, once issued.
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CI

Not Monitor
Monitor

Figure
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C2

Not Monitor

Monitor

[SO, SO]

PO, 421

w, 501

[45, 421

Payofs in Pure Common Pool Model- The Secured Case, HighRisk Debtor

As before in the debtor-misbehavior model, given the assumption that the total amount owed to C, is less than the lowest possible value for the project, C, always collects in full, and not-monitoring dominates monitoring. C, need not seek to deviate from the pro
rata rules or protect against a deviation. Instead, the upfront priority
structure ensures that C, will be paid in full. Now consider C,‘s
monitoring decision. In C,‘s case as well, not monitoring dominates
monitoring. Hence, neither player will monitor.54
This model predicts that creditors will take security interests in
high-risk firms. Low-risk firms will not be monitored even if only
unsecured credit is issued. Taking a security interest will introduce a
cost without an off-setting benefit. For high-risk firms, the value of
equity is increased through the use of secured credit as long as the
costs associated with creating secured credit are less than the total
monitoring costs of the individual creditors. Simply raising the interest rate at stage I will not alter these outcomes. Raising the interest rate cannot decrease and may increase the amount of monitoring at stage 2; conversely, lowering the interest rate may decrease the
amount of monitoring at stage 2.
The central difference between the view of monitoring here and
that in prior models is that here monitoring-at best-simply re54 This model assumes that there are no undetected withdrawals of assets
by creditors, or, to put it another way, that recovering withdrawn assets is
costless. That could be seen as in tension with the usual perception that recovering debtor withdrawals is costly-therefore justifying monitoring to nip
fraudulent dividends in the bud. The key difference between the two situations
is that recovery from the defaulting debtor is much harder than recovery from
the typical creditor. The debtor is insolvent or disappears to Rio, but the creditor generally is solvent and stays at home.
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distributes value among the creditors. Although not modeled here, a
more realistic assumption-and one more in tune with the common
pool analogy- i s that monitoring by creditors actually reduces the
amount of value available for distribution. In contrast, direct monitoring of the project decisions of the debtor enhances value for
creditors by preventing unilateral transfers of value to the debtor
through the adoption of high-risk projects.
This model suggests a plausible role for security interests. The
upfront priority a security interest creates minimizes the opportunities for the end-of-game efforts to subvert the pro rata rule that define the common pool problem. Second, and as important, the
model suggests that the common pool problem is not an immutable
feature of the relationship between a debtor and its multiple creditors. Whether a common pool problem even exists depends on the
capital structure of the debtor. Note, though, that this model predicts that no one monitors the debtor, which almost surely is counterfactual. A third model is required, one that combines debtor and
creditor misbehavior.
4. Debtor and Creditor Misbehavior

In the combined misbehavior model, the unmonitored debtor
will misbehave by switching to the high-risk project and a monitoring unsecured creditor will seek to defeat the pro rata distribution
rule. Monitoring has a dual character: it is useful in that it prevents
debtor misbehavior and ensures investment in the best projects, but
it is destructive in that it is the mechanism that permits creditor
misbehavior.
To reset the stage, the debtor will misbehave if neither creditor
monitors and will then select Project 2. Project 2 fails 90% of the
time and is worth $40 and succeeds IO% of the time and is worth
$635. For low-risk debtors, Project I succeeds 80% of the time and is
worth $122.75 and fails 20% of the time and is worth $84. For highrisk debtors, Project I succeeds only 50% of the time and is worth
$146 and fails 50% of the time and is worth $84. If a creditor monitors, the debtor cannot misbehave, but the creditor will seek to cheat
on the pro-rata rule.
Start with low-risk debtors and assume that the first-stage fee
schedules are set on the assumption that C, will monitor and C, will
not and that C, is reimbursed for its monitoring costs only if they
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are in fact incurred. That gives rise to the following payoff matrix in
the monitoring subgame:
C2

CI

Not Monitor

Monitor

Not Monitor

h 241

C469471

Monitor

b, 501

[47> 451

Figure 3.1: PuyoJg; in Combined Model= The Unsecured Case, Low-Risk
Debtor

This game is again dominance solvable. C, will monitor, regardless of what C, does, and therefore C, should not monitor. As in
the pure misbehavior model, monitoring is essential to prevent
debtor misbehavior, but, given that C, will be paid in full if it monitors, there is no need for a security interest to reach this result.
Moreover, the unsecured creditor will not monitor for possible creditor misbehavior given the high probability that the debtor’s project
will succeed. As in the common pool model, the high-probability of
success means that the unsecured creditor would not monitor to try
to deviate from the pro rata distribution rules. Security interests are
again irrelevant.
Now consider the high-risk debtor. Again assume that the firststage fee schedules are set on the assumption that C, will monitor
and C, will not. We get the following payoff matrix in the subgame:
C2
Not Monitor
CI

Monitor

Not Monitor
Monitor

Figure 3.2: Payofs in Combined Model= The Unsecured Case, High-Risk
Debtor, No Monitoring Expected

This subgame, too, is dominance solvable, but the result is that
both creditors monitor. This is not an equilibrium result in the game
as a whole, since neither creditor earns the competitive rate of return
(C, earns less and C, more), and the debtor, while needing one
creditor to monitor, needs only one.
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If the creditors instead assume that both creditors will monitor
in the subgame, we get the following payoff matrix:
C2

CI

Not Monitor

Monitor

Not Monitor

(23, 261

(3% 69

Monitor

(64, 4-4)

(5% 50)

Figure 3.3: Payofs in Combined Model- The Unsecured Case, High-Risk
Debtor, Monitoring Expected

This is dominance solvable, with both creditors monitoring and
earning competitive returns, but the debtor needlessly lowers the
value of equity as it bears the costs of two monitors.
Suppose instead that C, receives a security interest. If the creditors set their first-stage fee schedules on the assumption that C,
monitors and C, does not, we get the following payoff matrix:
C2
Not Monitor
CI

Monitor

Not Monitor
Monitor

p,;oj
:::

1:

1

Figure 3.4: Payofs in Combined Model- The Secured Case

This is dominance solvable, with C, monitoring and C, not monitoring. Each creditor earns a competitive rate of return, and the
value of equity is maximized, given the constraints.
A clear result emerges. High-risk debtors should issue secured
credit to minimize common pool problems. Doing so reduces the
total monitoring costs if the cost of issuing secured credit is less than
the monitoring cost of the non-monitoring creditor. This model
predicts a pattern of low-risk debtors with unsecured credit, and
high-risk debtors with secured credit. The secured creditor does the
monitoring, which is the behavior pattern thought to be present in
most secured lending.55
55 But compare Adler, supra note 27 (arguing that unsecured creditor
monitoring is critical for policing conflicts between managers and dispersed
equityholders).
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One should, however, note the limits of this model. The key
condition that gives rise to dominance solvability in the combined
model is that the secured creditor is assured of payment in full, even
when the debtor fails. The flipside of that result is that there must
be some, perhaps vanishingly small, pool of unencumbered assets in
the firm when it fails. It might therefore be argued that security interests shrink the size of the common pool but do not otherwise
eliminate the pool available for unsecured creditors. Understanding
that situation will require models with more than two creditors.
However it still seems likely that the potential size of the common
pool will affect the monitoring decisions of the unsecured creditors,
and therefore the importance of security interests in mitigating the
harms of the common pool will still carry through.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the 1980s, two separate strands of academic work in
commercial law focused on, respectively, explaining the pervasive
existence of secured credit and providing a theoretical basis for the
bankruptcy laws. This work tried to explain secured credit by focusing narrowly on the problem of the misbehaving debtor. At the
same time, much of bankruptcy law scholarship was premised on the
idea that bankruptcy law served to solve a common pool problem.
The common pool problem arises from an overlapping distribution
of rights among the unsecured creditors of the failing firm. No
creditor has the right to exclude another, and therefore the dominant strategy for each creditor may be to monitor the debtor to seek
to defeat the pro rata distribution scheme of bankruptcy. Almost no
attention was paid to the relationship between security interests and
common pools.
This paper presents an integrated treatment of these issues in a
standard game-theoretic context. The monitoring of debtor misbehavior has the form of the Battle of the Sexes game, except that the
players seek to coordinate on playing different strategies rather than
the same strategies as they usually do. Because of the multiplicity of
Nash equilibria, there can be no assurance that the creditors will
appropriately coordinate their decisions. I suggest that eliminating
multiple equilibria is a critical component of capital structure design.
In the simple debtor-misbehavior model, this amounts to no more
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than providing for payments that are contingent upon the amount
of monitoring performed. Responding to the problem of creditor
misbehavior requires a different design approach. Creditor misbehavior can have the form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Unlike the Battle
of the Sexes and its multiple equilibria, here a unique solution exists,
but it is a poor solution. Capital structure design is needed to reach a
different solution and security interests can serve as the mechanism
for reaching the superior solution.
Consequently, security interests do have an important role in the
efficient allocation of capital, but most of their benefits derive from
eliminating the duplicative monitoring of possible creditor misbehavior that defines the common pool. Moreover, the common pool
construct that currently forms the basis for our understanding of the
bankruptcy laws must be reconsidered. The existence or nonexistence of the unsecured common pool at the end of the firm’s life depends on the design of the firm’s capital structure at its inception.
The common pool need not arise, and we must reconsider what the
bankruptcy laws should accomplish once we have recognized that
the parties themselves can and in fact do much to keep this problem
from arising in the first place.
There may also be a broader principle at work here. I started by
noting the analogy made between the failing firm and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. I have argued that one way out of the dilemma is to embed the dilemma into a larger decisionmaking problem. The particular payoffs in the new subgame- t h e old, freestanding Prisoner’s
Dilemma-then emerge as results of the decisions in the larger
game, and the resulting payoffs should not have the structure that
leads to the devastating results of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Recognizing that a small game is embedded in a large game may
have substantial implications for legal analysis more generally. Simply recognizing a Prisoner’s Dilemma or some other game with
multiple or suboptimal equilibria may be insufficient. Knowing
when the dilemma stands alone (and when it does not) becomes
critical if we are to use these game-theoretic models to decide, as we
have with regard to the Bankruptcy Code, what problems the legal
system should address.

